BOSTON– The John F. Kennedy Presidential Library
and Museum today announced that it has declassified and made available
the final 45 hours of White House recordings that were secretly taped
during President John F. Kennedy’s time in office. In all, President
Kennedy recorded over 248 hours of meeting conversations and 12 hours of
dictabelt telephone conversations on a system that remained a closely
held secret even from his top aides. Today’s release encompasses
meetings held during the three months leading up to the end of the
Kennedy Administration.
“The Library has been systematically
reviewing and opening these secretly recorded tapes since 1993,” stated
Tom Putnam, Kennedy Library Director. “We are thrilled to have completed
the process and know researchers will be fascinated with these
recordings from John F. Kennedy’s final days as President.”
The
tapes cover a range of important topics, events, and even moments,
including: Vietnam, the 1964 presidential campaign, a discussion with
Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Oval Office visits from
President Kennedy’s children and the final recordings made before the
President left on his final trip to Texas.
Vietnam
During a meeting
on September 10, 1963 regarding the civil war in Vietnam, President
Kennedy expressed frustration with the conflicting reports provided to
him by his military and diplomatic advisors and asked them to explain
why their eye-witness accounts contrast so widely. General Victor Krulak
and State Department Advisor Joseph Mendenhall were reporting to the
President on their four day fact-finding mission to South Vietnam.
Krulak’s view, based on his visits with military leaders was generally
optimistic while Mendenhall, a Foreign Service Officer, shared his
impressions of widespread military and social discontent.
According
to the meeting minutes Krulak was on record as stating that “the Viet
Cong war will be won (by the United States) if the current US military
and sociological programs are pursued.” Meanwhile Mendenhall replied,
“The people I talked to in the government when I asked them about the
war against the VC, they said that is secondary now – our first concern
is, in effect, in a war with the regime here in Saigon. (pause). There
are increasing reports in Saigon and in Hue as well that students are
talking of moving over to the Viet Cong side.”
These vastly different viewpoints caused President Kennedy to pause and then comment: “You both went to the same country?”
After
nervous laughter, the President continued, “I mean how is that you get
such different - this is not a new thing, this is what we’ve been
dealing with for three weeks. On the one hand you get the military
saying the war is going better and on the other hand you get the
political (opinion) with its deterioration is affecting the military
…What is the reason for the difference – I’d like to have an explanation
what the reason is for the difference.”
The American government
had long been a supporter of South Vietnam President Ngo Dinh Diem but
policy makers were growing frustrated over the influence of Diem’s
brother Ngo Dinh Nhu and his wife, Madame Nhu. In August, a month prior
to the recorded meeting released today, Cable 243 had been issued
authorizing the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge, to
pressure Diem to remove his brother Nhu; if Diem refused, the US would
explore the possibility of alternative leadership. The issuance of the
controversial cable caused infighting among the diplomatic and military
advisors of the Kennedy Administration, which continued during the
autumn of 1963.
The September 10, 1963 meeting continued with a
presentation by advisor Rufus Phillips, which suggested various
counterinsurgency efforts. Remarking on these recommendations, former
Vietnam Ambassador Frederick Nolting asked, “What do you think will be
the result of this? … ‘Cause what I’m thinking about is what happens if
you start this and you get a reaction as expected from those that you’re
encouraging, do you then get a civil war or do you get a quiet palace
revolution or what do you think we get?”
Phillips answered that
he believed it was still possible to split the Nhus from President Diem.
He then commented: “When someone says that this is a military war, and
that this is a military judgment. I don’t believe you can say this about
this war. This is essentially a political war…for men’s minds.”
At
a meeting the following day on September 11, 1963, President Kennedy
asked Defense Secretary Robert McNamara if he thought that Diem’s reign
was viable long-term. McNamara answered, “Mr. President, I don’t believe
I can forecast that far ahead. I believe strongly that as of today
there has been no substantial weakening of the military effort. I don’t
know what the future will hold. I strongly support Dean Rusk’s
suggestion that we proceed carefully and slowly here and this is quite
contrary to what Ambassador Lodge has recommended.”
Later,
President Kennedy decided to send Robert McNamara and General Maxwell
Taylor to Vietnam. At the September 23, 1963 meeting, as Taylor and
McNamara are about to start their mission, the President stated his hope
that, based on what the two find, the US could “come to some final
conclusion as to whether …they’re (Diem and Nhu) going to be in power
for some time…and whether there is anything we can do to influence them
or do we stop thinking about that.”
At a Cabinet meeting that
same day, Undersecretary of State George Ball commented to the President
on Vietnam, “It’s not an easy situation … what we want to do is to see
if we can bring the situation about where the war can continue
successfully and come at some point to a conclusion, because we don’t
want to be bogged down in Southeast Asia forever.”
The coup in
Vietnam occurred six weeks later on November 1, 1963 resulting in the
assassination of both President Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu.
1964 Convention Plans
On
November 12, 1963, the President met with a team of political advisors
for several hours to discuss details of the 1964 convention and the
issues that might define the upcoming campaign. President Kennedy asked:
“But what is it that we can [do to] make them decide that they
want to vote for us, Democrats and Kennedy – the Democrats not strong in
appeal obviously as it was twenty years ago. The younger people, party
label – what is it that’s going to make them go for us. What is it we
have to sell them? We hope we have to sell them prosperity but for the
average guy, the prosperity is nil. He’s not unprosperous but he’s not
very prosperous; he’s not going make out well off. And the people who
really are well off, hate our guts. … We’ve got so mechanical an
operation here in Washington that it doesn’t have much identity where
these people are concerned.”
He also expressed strong opinions on the films to be played at the convention and the use of color film:
“Should
they be made in color?” he asked. “They’d come over the television in
black and white. I don’t know if maybe they’d come over the NBC one in
color. Probably a million watching it in color and it would have an
effect. I don’t know how much more expensive it is. Be quite an effect
on the convention. The color is so damn good. If you do it right”
Foreign Relations with the Soviet Union
In
a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on October 10,
1963, Mr. Gromyko commented that the present US-USSR relations did not
offer much of a “fresh look”. In response, President Kennedy suggested
recent achievements were evidence of how far relations between the two
nations had actually progressed:
“I don’t want you to be
discouraged. … There is only a certain tempo which you can move in these
matters. We’ve gone ahead with the test ban, we’ve made some progress
which for the United States is rather – do you realize that in the
summer of 1961, the Congress unanimously passed resolutions against
trade with the Soviets and now we’re going ahead, we hope, with this
very large trade arrangement that represents what’s changed in American
policy of some proportions. That’s progress.”
Kennedy Children in the Oval Office
In these final recordings, President Kennedy’s children, Caroline and John Jr., also appeared.
During the October 10, 1963 meeting with Minister Gromyko, President Kennedy introduced them to the Minister:
“You
can just open the door there – Just have you say hello to my daughter
and son. Come in a minute and say hello. Want to say hello to the
Minister? Do you want to say hello to John?” The President later
commented to the children, “His Chief is the one who sent you Pushinka.”
Caroline and John left the Oval Office but can be heard in the outer office area. After the meeting, the children returned.
Final Minutes of Taping
The
President would depart for Texas on November 21, 1963. On November
19th, his staff attempted to schedule a meeting with visiting General
Nasution of Indonesia and suggested Friday November 29th as a possible
time for the meeting. The President responded, “I’ll be at the Cape on
Friday – but I’ll see him Tuesday” (November 26th).
[On Friday November 29th, General Nasution met with President Lyndon Baines Johnson.]
The
final recording is from November 20, 1963, and President Kennedy can be
heard commenting on his plans for the following week stating, “I’ll
tell you what, I’m gonna get whatever I need for these -they were going
to have a briefing book for me by Saturday. I think I ought to be back
here til maybe 7:00, then I have to see Cabot Lodge on Sunday and then
have to get in touch with him on Monday. So you ought to have something
to take to Texas with me."
The November 20, 1963 recording was
the last secret White House tape made during the Kennedy Administration.
President John F. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas on November
22, 1963.
“Although on the one hand releasing the final
recordings is a bittersweet milestone, on the other, we hope that the
public will appreciate having the opportunity to hear these important
discussions first hand,” said Kennedy Library Archivist Maura Porter,
who has been overseeing the declassification of the White House
recordings since 2001. “The presidential recordings are an historical
treasure for those interested in truly feeling like a participant during
Oval Office discussions from this time period. No other avenue can
present the facts quite like listening to the players themselves.”
The
Kennedy Library is providing downloadable audio files and transcripts
of sixteen excerpts, most of which are highlighted in this release.
Kennedy Library Archivist Maura Porter is available to answer questions
from the media concerning this newly released tape or the Kennedy
Library Presidential tapes in general. She can be reached through Rachel
Flor, Director of Communications, at (617) 514-1662.
The
quality and clarity of the newly released tape recordings are good.
Today’s release is from Tape 109 through the final tape, 121/A57, and
encompasses over 45 hours of recordings.
The existence of the
Kennedy presidential tapes was first announced in July of 1973. The
initial segment of the presidential recordings was opened for public
research in June of 1983 and systematic review of the tapes began in
1993. Since that time, the Library staff has reviewed and opened all of
the telephone conversations and now the presidential meeting tapes. The
latter primarily capture meetings with President Kennedy in either the
Oval Office or the Cabinet Room. While the recordings were made
deliberately by the President, they were not created daily or with any
apparent set pattern. The tapes housed at the JFK Library represent raw
historical material. The sound quality of the recordings varies widely.
Although most of the recorded conversations are understandable, the
tapes include passages of extremely poor sound quality with considerable
background noise and periods in which speakers’ identities are
difficult to discern.
The White House recordings released today
are available for research use in the Library’s Research Room. The hours
of operation are Monday – Friday from 8:30 am - 4:30 pm and
appointments may be made by calling (617) 514-1629. The recordings and
their associated finding aid are available for purchase at the John F.
Kennedy Library, Columbia Point, Boston, MA 02125, or by calling the
Audiovisual Department (617) 514-1622. Members of the media are
cautioned against drawing historical conclusions from the sound clips
and transcripts alone. These materials are provided as a professional
courtesy to facilitate the reporting of the release of the presidential
recordings.
The John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum
is a presidential library administered by the National Archives and
Records Administration and supported, in part, by the John F. Kennedy
Library Foundation, a non-profit organization. The Kennedy Presidential
Library and the Kennedy Library Foundation seek to promote, through
educational and community programs, a greater appreciation and
understanding of American politics, history, and culture, the process of
governing and the importance of public service. More information is
available at www.jfklibrary.org.
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EXCERPTS AND TRANSCRIPTS
Vietnam
Tape
109: The September 10, 1963 meeting on Vietnam was essentially the
platform by which General Victor Krulak and Joseph Mendenhall to report
back to the President on their fact-finding mission to South Vietnam in
September of 1963. The four day trip by Krulak and Mendenhall was
intended to provide an overview of the military and civilian view of the
country. Krulak’s view, taken from his visits with military leaders was
generally optimistic on the progress of the war. Mendenhall, a Foreign
Service Officer, presented a view opposite of Krulak’s – one of
widespread military and social discontent. In the meeting minutes Krulak
is on record as stating that “excluding the very serious political and
military factors external to Vietnam, the Viet Cong war will be won if
the current US military and sociological programs are pursued.”
Mendenhall,
states, “The people I talked to in the government when I asked them
about the war against the VC, they said that is secondary now – our
first concern is, in effect, in a war with the regime here in Saigon.
(pause). There are increasing reports in Saigon and in Hue as well that
students are talking of moving over to the Viet Cong side.”
President Kennedy:
“You both went to the same country? (One out of the military, one’s
civilian). Well I mean how is that you get such different - this is not a
new thing, this is what we’ve been dealing with for three weeks. On the
one hand you get the military saying the war is going better and on the
other hand you get the political (opinion) with its deterioration is
affecting the military, now what – You two gentlemen are both – have a
lot of experience, I have a lot of confidence in both of you. What is
the reason for the difference – I’d like to have an explanation what the
reason is for the difference.”
Nolting asks:
“What do you think will be the result of this? Would it be a military
action against the Nhu’s? Would it be a military action against the
government? Or is it likely to result in a sort of a quiet decision on
the part of the Nhu’s that they’ve had it, their departure from the
country? ‘Cause what I’m thinking about is what happens if you start
this and you get a reaction as expected from those that you’re
encouraging, do you then get a civil war or do you get a quiet palace
revolution or what do you think we get?”
Phillips answered
that he believed it was still possible to split the Nhu’s from
President Diem. He then comments: “When someone says that this is a
military war, and that this is a military judgment. I don’t believe you
can say this about t his war. This is essentially a political war –
because to war for men’s minds. And if we lose the minds of these
people, we lose the minds of the officer corps and the civil servants,
we will have lost the war even though the appearances may look otherwise
for some time to come.”
Near the end of the meeting, the President comments that there will be a meeting on Vietnam the following day.
Tape 110: 9/11/63 Meeting on Vietnam:
President
Kennedy: “How much of a difference of opinion is there on Lodge’s
general feeling? It seems to me after listening to General Krulak and
those fellows from State that they’re probably both right. There hasn’t
been a real deterioration yet but it could set in. I think maybe two
months from now, with the school children and all the rest that must – I
would think he would maybe find that deterioration. So my judgment
would be, unless there’s some change there, that we’re probably going to
be worse off in 2-4 months. Now does Secretary McNamara, General Taylor
feel that or not?
Robert McNamara: Mr. President, I don’t
believe I can forecast that far ahead. I believe strongly that as of
today there has been no substantial weakening of the military effort. I
don’t know what the future will hold. I strongly support Dean Rusk’s
suggestion that we proceed carefully and slowly here and this is quite
contrary to what Ambassador Lodge has recommended. Fact is I read his
cable this morning, he recommended that we decide today to get rid of
Diem and Nhu, that we start of a course of action that will force that,
one way or another, if we try initially to force them out by stopping
aid and concurrently we support a coup attempt. I think that Secretary
Rusk is proposing that we not make any such decision today, that we not
take action that will lead certainly to that kind of a situation. I
strongly support this program he’s outlined. I don’t believe we’re ready
yet for measures as extreme as the Ambassador recommended because I
don’t myself believe we are certainly going to face a weakening of the
military effort over the next two months. It think its possible, it may
even be probable but I am particularly struck by the point that
Secretary Rusk mentioned, that Ambassador Lodge had not been in
communication with Diem on any effective basis.
Unnnamed voice:
He hasn’t been out of Saigon. He hasn’t seen the things that are going
on in the rest of the country, particularly the civil war.
John
McCone: We feel very much the same way as Secretary Rusk and Secretary
McNamara expressed themselves, that is, that we should move cautiously. I
think we have to recognize that Lodge hasn’t been there very long, he’s
only had one extended discussion with Diem, I’m sure it was not
productive. I think it could be well for him to have further talks and
also to…to become acquainted with the country.”
Tape 112: 9/23/63 meeting as Taylor and McNamara start their mission to Vietnam “What
we want to try and find out is, even now, somewhat confused for about
six weeks ‘cause the reports are so different so we might try, based
upon what you two find, come to some final conclusion as to whether Diem
– we, look as if they’re going to be in power for some time, and Nhu
and whether there is anything we can do to influence them or do we stop
thinking about that. We can reach out military if it’s going sorts begin
to unwind and….our worst situation , the situation where there would
continue to unwind against Diem and Nhu – what the hell would we do.
Then we’d have to take some rather desperate measures because we would
bear the responsibility six months from now.
Tape 112: 9/23/63 Cabinet Meeting, George Ball on Vietnam Ball:
“It’s not an easy situation, but it’s one where the problem really does
exist on two fronts, the military front and the domestic front. And
they are closely interrelated and what we want to do is to see if we can
bring the situation about where the war can continue successfully and
come at some point to a conclusion, because we don’t want to be bogged
down in Southeast Asia forever.
(Ball quote at 2:40 of clip)
Relations with the Soviet Union
10/10/63 President Kennedy and Andrei Gromyko on US-USSR relations
Gromyko: Not much of a fresh look.
President
Kennedy: I think we’ve done, ah, I don’t want you to get discouraged.
We’ve done – you may not be conscious of much progress where you sit,
but we’ve been pulling and hauling around the United States for the last
three months in a couple, several directions. And we think, for us,
we’ve made some progress in our relations with the Soviet Union. We may
not get the German question disposed of and may not have solved all the
matters, but considering some of the difficulties that both of our
countries face – and internally and externally – it seems to me we’ve
done pretty well. So I’m rather encouraged, not discouraged. I don’t
want you to be discouraged.
Gromyko: Well there is improvement in some things…
President
Kennedy: There is only a certain tempo which you can move in these
matters. We’ve gone ahead with the test ban, we’ve made some progress
which for the United States is rather – do you realize that in the
summer of 1961, the Congress unanimously passed resolutions against
trade with the Soviets and now we’re going ahead, we hope, with this
very large trade arrangement that represents what’s changed in American
policy of some proportions. That’s progress. We’re talking about next
week going ahead with this matter on the space, we’re talking about
getting the civil air agreement settled, we’ve got good communications…I
agree we haven’t settled Berlin but considering that we’ve got a lot of
problems, we’ve —you’ve taken out some of your troops out of Cuba so
it’s less of a problem for us here. I – that’s some progress.
Gromyko:
You are right, Mr. President, there is change in the atmosphere and …
in more matters important to our relations, affects relations between
United States and Soviet Union are concerned.
9/17/63 Foy Kohler and President Kennedy on US-USSR Space Cooperation
President Kennedy: The other thing I talked to him about was space. I don’t know whether we could ever –
Foy
Kohler: They were very intrigued by this, Mr. President. I mentioned
this when I talked to Gromyko before I left and it was obvious that they
were intrigued but a little puzzled by this. I referred to it as a very
imagining thing and asked whether they had given any thought to it. He
said, well, they agreed it was imaginative. (pause) They’re obviously
interested in this – by implication, they are clearly concerned about
the cost of these damn things – about a race in space. So Gromyko said,
well, it’s a very interesting idea and we would like you to come up with
something more definite which we can take a look at. So far, I haven’t
been able to consult with all the right people here to see whether
anything can be developed.
President Kennedy: I would like to have
an agreement on when we both try to go to the moon, then we wouldn’t
have this intensive race –I don’t know whether they are going to the
moon. Lovell says not.
Kohler: I think maybe he’s right. They have
got – you think you have a serious resource distribution problem but
believe me, Mr. Khrushchev has a more serious one. The pressure of the
claims on a very limited budget must be enormous there and he does refer
to it occasionally. Well my military people say one more, my scientist
are always waning more – the pressures must be great when resources are
very limited.
1964 Convention plans and Campaign, 11/12/63
JFK on what we offer voters: “But
what is it that we can make them decide they want to vote for us,
Democrats and Kennedy – the Democrats not strong in appeal obviously as
it was twenty years ago. The younger people, party label – what is it
that’s going to make them go for us. What is it we have to sell ‘em. We
hope we have to sell ‘em prosperity but for the average guy, the
prosperity is nil. He’s not unprosperous but he’s not very prosperous;
he’s not going make out well off. And the people who really are well
off, hate our guts. So that, what is it – there’s a lot of negroes,
we’re the ones that are shoving the negroes down his throat. What is it
he’s got though. We’ve got peace, you know what I mean, we say we hope
the country’s prosperous, I’m trying to think of what else. I think
probably- we’ve got so mechanical an operation here in Washington that
it doesn’t have much identity where these people are concerned. And they
don’t feel particularly – I’m not, they really didn’t have it with
Truman, only in that retrospect they have Truman…hell of a time.
Franklin Roosevelt had it, even Wilson had it but I think it’s tough for
a Democrat with that press apparatus working. So I’m just trying to
think what is it – (tape ends)
__
JFK on the films to be played at the 1964 Convention and the use of color film President
Kennedy: “Steve, on this question of the films and who’s going to do
them. I thought that film Five Days or Cities in June was – have you
seen that film? The guy who wrote the music was called Vershon or
something, but God it’s good. Why don’t you get it from George Stevens.
Five Cities in June. Look at it. I think the guy’s fantastic. I’d like
to see what else he’s done, whether that just happened to be lucky
(Krim has spoken to Stevens about it. Who it is that he’s been using.)
(RFK: I’ll tell you George did a number of those films that played at Burnhead.)
President Kennedy: “Can’t we get George Stevens to work on the films? “
__
President
Kennedy: “Should they be made in color? They’d come over the television
in black and white. I don’t know if maybe they’d come over the NBC one
in color. Probably a million watching it in color and it would have an
effect. I don’t know how much more expensive it is. Be quite an effect
on the convention. The color is so damn good. If you do it right. I
don’t know whether he’s got – has film he’d want to use in color. But
anyway, that be silly why bring that... You’d have a film the first
night, ahead of the keynoter.”
Bailey: This is just a possibility,
Mr. President, we’re gonna make – we’ve got an awful lot of money to
spend. My thought was – which is convention money, you see, it has to be
spent on the convention not partisan campaign money. Some of them could
be shown at the Convention, we could make a whole lot of a show in some
back room convention then you’ve got, then you can use it.”
--
President
Kennedy: I think you can get the real story told if it’s a good
speaker. That’s why the film’s gonna be – and you might lead off with
the film, then the keynoter ‘cause people are sick of it after half hour
of watching anyway - if you lead off with the film, then the keynoter.”
_
President Kennedy: “ Just looking at the way that “Five
Cities in June” is done is fascinating. So I mean I’d rather tell less
then get sort of a…then I would jammed in with eighteen different cotton
mills moving.”
__
JFK on the film of the four Democratic
President’s in the century: “There’s no doubt, I don’t think there’s
anything wrong with a short one on Franklin Roosevelt.
Bailey: “Well
what you could do is on the Democratic Party is have the five
Presidents of – that we’ve had since, er, Cleveland, Wilson…
President
Kennedy: Well, this century. I think, I think Wilson, Roosevelt,
Truman…but I think that uh, I think that Wilson’s good if you can get a
lot of good film. Roosevelt, Truman, I think that’s a good idea – four
Democratic Presidents – that’s a good idea.
Bailey: And that way you – can bring you in at the end.
__
President Kennedy reviewing states and commenting on his chances in 1964: President
Kennedy: “Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont. Well there’s a chance we’ll
carry one of those states. What do you put on winning New Hampshire?”
(No) (Indiana?)
Bailey: “Well let’s go through this, I mean, let’s talk ‘em over.”
President
Kennedy: “…well let’s not quit in Indiana and Iowa. Let’s quit on
Kansas and Nebraska. North Dakota? That’s possible. What do you say
Dick, possible?
Dick Maguire, Treasurer of the DNC: “Possible. If
you could do it you’ll also do it elsewhere. It’s not as big that you
make a particular pitch for it. There’s a general trend it’ll get for
you.
President Kennedy: “North Dakota. South Dakota. Oklahoma??”
Bailey: “That was the worst we’ve had…”
President
Kennedy: “ – religion is deep now, maybe it’s -I sure would think we
had a chance to carry Oklahoma as do Indiana or Ohio.” (I don’t
know).(Percentage wise) “You’ve got one Dem – Republican Congress. “
(Republican governors).